## THE FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN NEOCONSERVATISM

#### Abstract

This article discusses the neoconservative ideology of the United States in the field of foreign policy, the formation, development of ideas and concepts, and the role of modern US political discourse. It also analyzes the role of foreign policy in the evolution of neoconservatism, the foreign policy views of neoconservatism theorists and their conflicting character. Attention is paid to the peculiarities of the periodization of the evolution of the doctrine of foreign political neoconservatism.

*Key words:* Political ideology, USA, ideology of neoconservatism, foreign policy, evolution of neoconservatism, neoconservative foreign policy.

### Introduction

The contradictory nature and comprehensiveness of neoconservative views in the United States does not allow us to make complete conclusions on neoconservatism. That is why the analysis of the ideology of neoconservatism in the United States is largely focused on analyzing and criticizing foreign policy approaches. Studies show the influence of neoconservative ideas on foreign policy decision-making and how conceptual approaches to this are shaped and systematized by various factors. While the development of neo-conservatism's foreign political ideology is an integral part of the US neoconservatism system as an influential ideological movement, it is possible to gain a greater understanding of the essence of modern neoconservatism as a separate research object. After all, neoconservativeism has its own peculiarities in foreign policy. That is why neo-conservatives come to the attention of US and foreign media.

#### Materials and methods

The neoconservative's focus on foreign policy was shaped by internal problems and the socio-cultural crisis that swept across the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, the problems associated with the war in Vietnam, and the decision by the Lindon Johnson government to increase military spending by reducing social spending, have frustrated the "Great Society" dreams. In general, due to the increasing number of failed wars and social crises, the mood of the society has increased. At the same time, a culture that ignores ethical norms has become widespread in society. Again, the status of left-wing ideas has risen. These processes triggered a sharp split within the Democratic Party. As a result, Republicans came to power in the coming elections.

The intellectuals united around the magazine "Commentary", founded as a promoter of neoconservative ideas, were considered Democrat-traditionalists in their time. They relied mainly on traditional liberalism in the economy, conservatism in social issues and anticommunism in foreign policy [16, P. 198-199]. Therefore, the opposition within the Democratic Party was formed as forces. It was at this time that American socialist Michael Harrington first applied the concept of "neoconservatism." He tries to characterize former liberals who have become more and more right through this notion[5]. Irving Kristol later applied this notion to himself, and was soon popularized.

The neoconservatives were convinced that, regardless of the outcome of the Vietnam War, the fight against communism was to be one of the most important missions of US society. That is why they came up with the idea to bring this struggle to the international arena. "Commentary", led by Norman Podhoretz, one of the founders of neoconservatism in the 1960s,

began to focus on international relations and national security. From this point on we can say that the development of foreign policy approach of neoconservatism in the USA has begun. However, it is important to pay attention to a number of aspects. First, foreign policy was not a priority for many first generation neoconservatives. Second, there has never been a single approach among international adherents in international affairs.

For example, the views of I. Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, ideological leaders of neoconservatism, differ. I.Kristol was in the position of political realism and endorsed the policy of the Nixon and Ford government over the USSR. He was skeptical of the idea of the "American mission", which symbolizes the need to promote democracy in the world. He argues that the idea is appealing from the outside, but it is enough to think for a few minutes to see how empty it is...[11]. Moreover, in his foreign policy views, he concludes that "neoconservatives have no system of strict principles on foreign policy, but they have a set of specific approaches based on historical experience"[12, P.13]. In turn, Norman Podhoretz's ideas were completely different. For him, first, the struggle for ideology was paramount. Without it, discussions about US foreign policy are aimless and irrelevant. For him and other neoconservatives, Soviet ideology was the subject of global political confrontation. It is universal to American values based on universal principles. Daniel Patrick Moynihan also focused on ideology, arguing that the main problem in US foreign policy is that, unlike totalitarian countries, there is insufficient attention to the role of ideology[14].

When considering the foreign policy approaches of US neoconservatism, it is important to pay attention to the ideas of such representatives as Norman Podhoretz, D. Moynihan and J. Kirpatrick. Representatives of the stream, such as I.Kristol, N.Glazer, D.Bell, have more moderate foreign policy views, focusing mainly on US domestic life. Therefore, neoconservatism has primarily positioned itself as an internal political movement. At the same time, there were some of them who had a different perspective on world politics. It was these ideas that drew the attention of the Reagan government and laid the groundwork for the development of the second generation of neoconservatism. In the 1970s, neo-conservatism had a profound influence on US domestic and foreign policy, and in the 1980s it emerged as the political ideology of the American ruling elite, even though it was informal.

Therefore, the 1960s and 1970s were a time of neo-conservatism's foreign policy ideology. In the early 1980s, many neoconservatives joined the Republican Party. During this time, many neoconservatives settled in the American Institute of Entrepreneurship. Among them were I.Kristol, J. Kirpatrick, B. Wottenberg, J. Muravchik and many others. Although the neo-conservative efforts of the late 1970s and early 1980s failed to adequately influence Carter's foreign policy, the activation and influence of neoconservatives increased with the start of the Reagan presidency. Massively, neoconservative foreign policy issues have begun to rise. Kirpatrick's "double standards" became one of the foundations of the Reagan Doctrine. One of Mr. Kirpatrick's great contributions to the development of foreign policy approaches to neoconservatism was the commentary in 1979 in the Commentary magazine entitled "Dictatorship and Double Standards." In it, the main idea is the threat of autocratic democracy on the socialist path, positively evaluating the democratic flexibility of classical autocracies.

During the Reagan presidency, a number of neoconservatists were practicing politics. In particular, Kirpatrick was a US Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1981 to 1985 and a member of the National Security Council. P. Wolfowitz worked at the State Department as Director of the Department of Political Planning and Assistant Secretary of State. Mr. Ambrams also worked at the State Department. Richard Perl has been named Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. Representatives of the second generation of neoconservatives, R.Kagan and W.Kristol, also gained their political experience by holding a number of positions in the Reagan government. In the second half of the 1980s during the period of M. Gorbachev's rule in the USSR, the relevance of neoconservative foreign policy approaches fell sharply.

"Commentary" magazine began to lose popularity due to a lack of new ideas in the face of changing circumstances. His successor was replaced by "The National Interest" magazine, founded in 1985 by I. Kristol. The end of the Cold War posed the risk of losing the importance of ideological factor and the relevance of neoconservatism. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s, neoconservatives continued to be the influential wing of the Republican Party. Commentary magazine acknowledges that the last and decisive battle in the Cold War was driven by ideas and lettering machines, not tanks and missiles[1, P.158].

The emergence of a second generation of neoconservatives on the political scene following the end of the Cold War also prompted the need for the US to redefine foreign policy. Now they are inextricably linked to the ideals of global dominance of the United States as a trail of victory in the Cold War and as a guarantee of the stability of the emerging polar system. In most recent studies and analyzes, the neoconservative's main idea has been to acknowledge US secular leadership and defend human rights, the US's active involvement in the promotion of democracy, and the need for aggression when needed.

The development of neoconservative foreign political views in the post-Cold War period was shaped by the second generation of neoconservative. In this study, Francis Fukuyama, a prominent American scientist who put forward the concept of "history of intuition" as the epitome of the victory of liberal-democratic ideas, lists four main features of neoconservatism in his research. The first is concern about democracy, human rights and ... the domestic policy of states. Politically, it represents a change in the traditional American foreign policy's isolationist approach .... Second, the belief that US power is used for morally justified purposes. The "moral obligation" of this neo-conservatism is seen in the claims of little George Bush that "God" had instructed him to "end the tyranny in Iraq" and ordered the liberation of Iraqi citizens[13]. Third, to deal with serious security problems with mistrust of international law and international institutions. This allows the US to unilaterally address international issues[4, P.4-5].

Drawing on the conclusions of the neoconservative theorists, it is clear that the central principle of neoconservative foreign policy doctrine is to achieve a wider recognition of the notion of "US national interests." According to William Kristol, the "national interests" for the great diocese are not geopolitical concepts. Only the interests of small states go beyond their borders, and their international policies are often of a defensive nature. The interests of the great nations are also great .... The United States has always felt an obligation to protect democratic institutions from the influence of undemocratic forces. Therefore, during World War II, our national interests protected France and Britain. That is why we feel the need to protect Israel, which is threatened today. Here, our national interests need not be complicated by any complex geopolitics[24].

It is well known that the interests of society are inextricably linked to national interests. Foreign policy goals are inextricably linked to internal politics, cultural values and public behavior. Proponents of neoconservatism believe that a healthy society wants to pursue an effective foreign policy and that social order based on egoistic principles cannot survive. The stronger the individual orientation in society, the stronger the community becomes. Egoism undermines the possibilities of collective defense and creates foreign policy indifference. External policy goals in society can only bring health benefits if they are widely accepted. In other words, such conclusions are criticized for their inadequacy and ineffectiveness of liberal ideas[20, P. 321.].

Another peculiarity of neoconservative foreign policy ideology is that neoconservatives have been skeptical of international institutions. In particular, neoconservative views on the UN's activities have also emerged. From 1981 to 1985, he served as US Ambassador to the United Nations. According to Kirkpatrick, the UN has become an opportunity to polarize its members rather than to solve existing problems collectively. That is, it is a place to vote and encourage a certain party to choose. Even if the voting state has no personal interest in a particular discussion, it is bound to stand by somebody[3].

Bolton, the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 2005-2006, cites a number of shortcomings when criticizing the UN. For example, the UN only becomes active during periods of major international crises, particularly the Gulf War[2]. However, there are drawbacks to the veto rights of permanent members of the UN Security Council. In particular, they are not all democratic countries. In other words, non-democracies also freely express themselves within the UN. Another problem is the UN funding. For example, in 2016, the contribution of the United States to the United Nations was 22% of the total. But that's not giving the US any priority, neoconservatives say.

According to Muravchik, the UN cannot control its members' activities and prevent new conflicts[15, P. 1–5.].

Neoconservatives have seriously objected to a number of arms agreements. These range from nuclear weapons testing agreements to mid-range and short-range missile restraint agreements. In general, neoconservatives believe that US security, in turn, relies on US armed forces, not on gun control[10]. That is, in the anarchic context of international relations, the reduction or limitation of US military might make little sense. For their part, neoconservatives of the United States support military cooperation, in particular the military bloc led by it. In this regard, U.Cherchil's view that "in the course of cooperation with the Allies, they sometimes have their own views," and such approaches are in full agreement with the views of the neoconservative movement. From the point of view of neoconservatives, NATO has the opportunity to fulfill many of the UN tasks. With the end of the Cold War, it became a central element of the community of nations that united common political values[18]. This military bloc is a guarantor of world order.

The modern neoconservative concept of US military development can be traced back to the early 2000s. On the eve of the presidential election, PNAC presented its report "Reconstruction of American Defense: Strategy, Forces, and the Sources of the New American Age." This document was prepared jointly with representatives of the US Armed Forces, military academic institutions and large corporations. The objectives in this document are in line with the objectives set out in the 1992 Defense Planning Guide. Neoconservatives show that the US military achievements in the post-Cold War and the Gulf war have now come to the point of overlooking "extreme caution"[21, P. 236.]. In turn, it is necessary to get rid of the Vietnam War syndrome.

Researchers are trying to uncover the characteristics of neoconservative foreign policy, based on the trends in US neoconservative foreign policy and the implementation of certain ideological concepts. In particular, Blokhin concludes that the foreign policy concept of neoconservatism is characterized by a number of important ideas: the recognition of the United States as a hyperperm in the context of global interests; US domination; mistrust of international institutions and unilaterally changing the world on its own rules; unilaterism in foreign policy; Implementing a liberal revolution based on the idea of "what is good for America is good for others"; to portray the world as black and white as a war between democracy and authoritarianism, and relying on the moral justification of US national interests[22, P.45].

Another important aspect of US neoconservatism research is the issue of foreignization of neoconservatism doctrine. The importance of the matter is that foreign policy principles and concepts formed at specific times have common and distinctive features. Researchers therefore recognize the following system of cycles:

The first stage covers 1940-1950s. In this period neoconservatism appears as a set of ideas and intellectual streams. Its history is related to the influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe, with representatives from all over New York City College, including Christopher, D. Bell, I. Howe, S.Martin Lipset, F. Selznik, N. Glaser, and D. Patrick. The first generation of neoconservative neo-Mancinians appeared.

The second phase, including the 1960s and 1970s, saw the transformation of the intellectual stream into political class ideology, and concrete foreign policy concepts influenced political decision-making. The concept of neoconservatism began to apply in the 1970s. This

stage is explained by the fact that neo-conservatism is not a party. The Democratic majority coalition was the center of consolidation. At the same time, right-wing press networks and "mental centers" began to be formed. Commentary magazine, published by N. Podgorets, has emerged as the main ideological and harmonious center of neoconservatism. One of the central ideas of neo-conservatism is the growing tendency of anti-communism, its willingness to fight against the Soviet Union, nuclear stability, and ideological influence on third world countries.

The neoconservatives have formed an important instrument of US foreign policy through the use of a new tool in ideological struggle - the theme of legal protection. As the brightest representatives of the legal protection movement of this period were Moynihan, J. Kirkpatrick, G. Jackson came out.

The third modern phase of neoconservatism began during the strategic recession of the 1990s, and was clearly manifested by the neoconservative influence of the next generation of representatives of the younger Bush government. The main ideological program of their activities was presented and promoted under the manifestations of Existing Threats and the Project for the New American Age. Neoconservative projects were implemented in the Bush Doctrine. Although the Union of Former Soviet Socialist Republics no longer existed, the idea of US domination, defensive warfare, and the promotion of global democracy were recognized as the basis of neoconservative worldview. It has been reflected in foreign policy activities under the Bush administration[23]. Based on the conclusions of the development of neoconservative ideological process. At the same time, we believe that the researcher's coverage as the third modern stage from the 1990s to the present does not fully capture the neoconservative views for 2000-2008 and to analyze the system of ideas formed from 2009 to the present as the fifth phase of neoconservative foreign policy.

One of the peculiarities of the analysis of the evolution of the neoconservative foreign policy ideology of the United States is reflected in the relationship of neoconservative theorists to international relations and world politics.

The foreign policy ideology of neoconservatism considers international relations as a highly conflict, anarchic environment, and recognizes the crucial importance of the power factor. According to the neoconservatives, humanity will always exist in the "anarchic world of the Gobbs" where international legal norms are ineffective, promoting security and liberal order depends on the existing military power and willingness to apply it[6].

In anarchic international relations, the power of a particular state is more important to neoconservatives. R. Kagan points out that this rule has been relevant since the Roman Empire, and it is still .... In spite of possible abuse, military power remains a universal instrument for addressing issues[8].

According to the neoconservative foreign policy approach international law and institutions are ineffective and may play a negative role in the promotion of national interests. Allied countries are perceived by neoconservatives as a situation where the interests are aligned. However, their credibility is questionable, and the main means to stop them is military power. Another peculiarity for neoconservatism is its rigorous approach to the evaluation of the foreign policy of a state through its political system. Autocracy, authoritarian regimes are more aggressive subjects of international relations, and at the domestic political level they are not bound by certain constraints. And democracies are more peacemakers. Kirpatrick also notes that there is a need for US power to survive a liberal democracy[9,P.3–16].

Based on historical experience, neoconservatism is close to realism approaches as the main source of theoretical and empirical findings on security strategy and foreign policy. Like political realism, neoconservatism views the national state as the main subject[7,P.3,64]. But neoconservatism, by contrast, denies the "power balance" and "ideological de-nationalization" of important concepts of realism. A convergence factor with the liberal paradigm is the strategy for

spreading democracy. But the difference is the use of military force. For neoconservatism, moral correctness is important, not factual fact.

Unlike the realists who place the "balance of power" on the basis of stability and the system of relations in international relations, neoconservatives try to express this issue through the ideology of "American choice" and the universality of American socio-political principles. That is, instead of trying to balance the United States, a weak state should seek to unite with it[17,P.196]. But this proposal only applies to democratic institutions. However, it should be noted that US neoconservative initiatives today caused negative results, first of all, the negative attitude of the world community towards the United States, a decline in the image of Democratic leadership[19,175-178].

### Results

The analysis of the problem shows that the neoconservative idea of "Intervention for Freedom" is somewhat delicate, and that the idealistic concept of right does not exclude the use of elements of realism. In the structure of national interests, neoconservatives combine and combine realistic elements (power, intervention) with idealistic elements (the nature of political structures, values, ideas, commitment to historical traditions, freedom). This merger limits the recognition of neoconservatives as W.Kristol and R.Kagan as representatives of the realist school. Idealistic elements undoubtedly dominate the interpretation of their national interests. The pursuit of idealistic policies leads to the use of double standards. In particular, the US sometimes ignores democratic values and human rights abuses when it is in its interests. In addition, the imposition of democratic ideas on the world by force is not in line with democratic principles. This has been the focus of palaeoconservatives R.Kirk and P.Buchanan from classical conservatism, and criticizes neoconservative behavior. This shows that the foreign policy idea of neoconservatism goes far beyond the values-ideological paradigm and rejects the traditional approach of the concept of sovereignty. This is because the idea of exporting liberal values, in turn, calls for a conflict with national sovereignty. Instead, some neoconservatives (particularly F. Fukuyama) propose the principle of "divided sovereignty". Accordingly, "unstable" countries must transfer certain parts of their sovereignty to a more powerful partner or international organization.

The analysis shows that there is no consensus among researchers that neoconservatives are involved in any particular school in international relations theory. For example, N.Geydarov introduces neoconservatives at the same time as the two schools - liberal-interventionists who are the heirs of the Morgentau School of Political Realism and the Hegemonic School of Realism. American scientist T.A.Shakleina, in his classification of geopolitical schools, views neoconservatives as representatives of the "strict hegemony" school.

In general, the neoconservatives of the new era of US foreign policy positions are as follows: First, patriotism is a natural and healthy feeling that needs to be expanded by private and public institutions; secondly, secular power directed towards political globalization results in secular tyranny. It is desirable to look at international institutions that are secular governments; Thirdly, statesmen must be able to distinguish a friend from the enemy in the first place. This is not easy, as I.Kristol believes, as the Cold War history proves.

Consequently, neoconservative foreign policy views tend to be binary (ie, bad, positive or negative), and are clearly reflected in foreign policy. At each stage of the development of neoconservatism, the ideological-political system adds new ideological and value elements to its adherents, without changing their basic principles.

The ideology of US neoconservatism embraces elements of classical paradigms in the theory of international relations - political realism and liberalism. Neoconservatism is a peculiar subjective reality in international relations and world politics that defines the long-term and priority US goals in this area.

Several permanent elements of the neoconservative foreign policy model can be distinguished: first, by their nature, international relations are anarchic, and historic experience shows that military power remains a decisive factor in interstate politics. Second, international

law cannot be effective in this system of international relations. International organizations cannot be a tool for regulating international relations and foreign policy. Thirdly, the form of internal government determines foreign policy. Fourth, in the form of governance, the interconnectedness of society and national interests is important. A healthy society needs to understand and understand its foreign policy goals. It encourages understanding of internal degradation and external risks. Fifth, the United States must rely on universal values, the principles of natural law, and fight for the survival and survival of the democratic world as a state with its modern armed forces and influence.

Based on the analysis, four fundamental principles of neoconservative ideas are formed:

1) The internal nature of the regime influences foreign policy, and it should be based on liberal democratic principles;

2) America's strength has been tested and it can be used for its intended purpose, and the United States must actively participate in international relations. From the point of view of neoconservatives, power should be used primarily as a foreign policy instrument, not at the end.

3) Distrust of large-scale social construction projects;

4) Unreliable attitude towards international law and the effectiveness of international institutions in ensuring justice and security. In their view, all contracts and agreements are aimed at "limiting and controlling" US forces, rather than supporting world order.

# **General conclusions**

The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the evolution of US foreign policy ideology:

- Neoconservatism US foreign policy for half a century and have taken a leading role in the political culture of the society at different times. At times, neo-conservatism has emerged as a major force in leading foreign political schools, particularly in opposition to realism. For example, there was an influx of opposition to the principles of realism during the reigns of R. Nixon, J. Ford, and partly by J. Carter. But neoconservatism has always influenced US foreign policy decisions to varying degrees;

- Foreign policy views of neoconservatives there were methodological difficulties in identifying them with liberal Wilsonists. For example, neo-conservatives are sometimes called hard-line Wilson. Therefore, the Wilsonists themselves form part of the neoconservative movement. Their common features can be explained by the support of the US global mission to promote liberal democratic values. In addition, both categories promote intervention for development. The difference between them is that the Williamson relies on the collective action of liberal democratic ideas under international law. They see international institutions as the source of the legitimacy of their policies. On the contrary, neoconservatives are skeptical of international institutions and rely on unilateralism and unilaterism. In their view, unilaterism is the immense power of the American empire in shaping the modern world order;

- All the events taking place in the world on the basis of the neoconservative foreign policy concept are based on a values-ideological paradigm that is approached from the point of view of neoconservative ideological values. The formation of idealistic paradigms is linked to the need to combat communism in the Cold War;

- The national interests of the neoconservatives based on commitment to fundamental ideas and self-esteem. The US responsibility and commitment to protecting liberal democracy around the world requires intervention. According to neoconservative ideologists, the world is not perfect yet, and many countries are far from the ideas of liberalism. Even in developed countries, democracy is not a product of genuine historical development. The idea of exporting liberal democracy during the Cold War fought the Soviet military machine, and the United States began a multilateral campaign. In the post-Cold War era, there is a need for one-sided display of its capabilities.

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